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AB STRACT
In this paper we present a model of a balance-of—payments crisis and use
it to examine the Argentine experiment with a crawling peg between December
1978 and February 1981. The approach taken allows us to examine the evolution
of a crisis when the collapse is not a perfectly-foreseen event. The
implementation of the model yields plausible values of the one-month ahead
probabilities of a collapse of the crawling peg. The probabilities exhibit a
sharp increase in the middle of 1980 and indicate a significant loss of
credibility throughout the remainder of the year. The results suggest that
viability of an exchange rate regime depends strongly on the domestic credit
policy followed by the authorities. If this policy is not consistent with the
exchange rate policy pursued by the authorities, confidence in the exchange
rate policy is undermined.
Robert Cumby Sweder van Wijnbergen
GSBA Country Policy Department
New York University The World Bank
100 Trinity Place 1818 H Street, NW
New York, NY 10006 Washington, DC 204331
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the viability of a regime in which the exchange rate
follows a preannounced rate of crawl.An important aspect of the paper is
that we are able to analyze the credibility of announced policy in a rational
expectations setting by focusing on the consistency between fiscal and
domestic credit policies on the one hand and the preannounced rate of crawl on
the other hand.Agents, uncertain about whether the crawling peg will be
adhered to, learn over time about the viability of the exchange rate regime by
observing the behavior of the authorities and infering whether observed
domestic credit and fiscal policies are consistent with the announced rate of
crawl.At the beginning of each period agents must make their portfolio
decisions based on their assessment of the probability that the crawling peg
will be abandoned prior to the beginning of the following period.Their
actions will, in turn, affect the probability of collapse.
Krugman (1979), building on a seminal paper by Salant and Henderson (1978)
derives the timing of a speculative attack in a deterministic framework when
domestic credit policy is inconsistent with the exchange rate regime.1 The
timing of a run on the central banks reserves of foreign exchange is
determined by exploiting the fact that Intertemporal arbitrage rules out a
discrete devaluation of the exchange rate.In a deterministic setting the
timing of the attack is know in advance, so that no forward discount occurs on
'Discussion of the consistency conditions fiscal and credit policies must
satisfy in order to be compatible with a given exchange rate regime are found
in van Wijnbergen (1983), Buiter (1986b), and Obstfeld (1986b).2
short maturity contracts.
Flood and Garber (1985) extend Kruginan's analysis by introducing
uncertainty about future domestic credit growth and going to a discrete time
framework. This set-up has the desirable characteristic of a positive forward
discount even on short maturity contracts and leads to uncertainty about
timing of potential future speculative attack. In their model, as in Salant
and Henderson (1978) and Krugman (1979), a run occurs when agents realize that
postponing a run will result in a discrete jump in the exchange rate after
central bank reserves are exhausted.In each period, the probability of
collapse in the next period can be found by evaluating the probability that
domestic credit in the next period will be sufficiently large to result in a
discrete depreciation should a run occur.
In this paper we extend the analysis of' Flood and Garber (1985) in two
important directions.First, we introduce uncertainity about the level of
foreign reserves that will trigger abandonment of the exchange rate regime.
Second, we Implement the model empirically using the Argentine experiment with
a crawling peg during 1979 and 1980 and calculate the one-period ahead
collapse probabilities implied by the model.
The first of these is clearly of great empirical relevance. In addition,
it has Important implications concerning the timing of a regime collapse. We
argue that a speculative attack that will exhaust reserves will occur only if
the central bank allows It to occur. The central bank can prevent such an
attack by abandoning the exchange rate regime. Since agents do not know the3
central bank'sdecisionrule, they cannot calculate the critical level of
domestic credit that will result In a discrete devaluation.
The plan of the paper is as follows.In section 2 we provide a brief
overview of the recent Argentine experience with a crawling peg, which
provides some of the motivation for the study.In section 3 we set our the
theoretical model and present a rational expectations solution. The model is
then used to analyze the Argentine crawling peg in section 11. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Argentine Experience
In this section we provide a brief review of the Argentine stabilization
of the late 1970's that motivates some of' the questions that we address with
the theoretical model In the next section.2 In March 1976, the government of
Mrs. Isabel Peron was removed by a military coup. At the time of the coup,
inflation had reached levels exceeding the three hundred percent at an annual
rate and the public sector deficit was approximately seventeen percent of' GDP.
The new military government introduced a series of reforms aimed at
removing or reducing a number of controls over the economy.Among these
reforms were the gradual removal of' capital controls, the freeing of interest
2ThIs section draws on the papers by Kaminsky (1981), Easterly (1982), Calvo
(1983), and Connolly (1986).4
rates and some reduction in trade barriers.3 In addition, the inflation rate
was reduced substantially but remained in excess of one hundred percent by the
end of 1978.
In December 1978 a new stabilization program aimed at reducing the rate of
inflation was put in place. Exchange rate policy was at the center of the new
program.The exchange rate was to follow a preannounced rate of crawl
specified by a table of daily exchange rates (the "tablita").It was hoped
that by reducing the rate of depreciation gradually to zero, Argentine
inflation would converge to the inflation rates of her major trading partners.
To enhance the credibility of the program, the rate of crawl was announced
several months in advance and the "tablita" was extended periodically long
before the existing table expired.
During the first year of the new stabilization program the declining rate
of depreciation was accompanied by a declining public sector deficit and a
deceleration of domestic credit.By the end of 1979, the public sector
deficit amounted to only 5% of GDP.
In March 1980 a financial crisis sparked by bank failures resulted in a
sharp increase in central bank lending to the financial system and a decline
in confidence in the stabilization program. The increase in credit to the
3Barriers to free foreign exchange transactions were virtually removed by
the end of 1978. At that time the only remaining restriction was that foreign
loans had a one-year minimum duration.Kaininsky (1981) observes how this
requirement could be circumvented fairly easily.The minimum duration was
reduced to one month in June 1980.5
financial system in March 1980 was followed by increased central bank
financing of the public sector in the second half of 1980, further undermining
confidence In the viability of the crawling peg regime.The loss In
confidence was reflected in an Increase in Interest rates on peso deposits
relative to foreign rates adjusted for announced depreciation, and large
reserve losses.By the end of 1980 the interest differential adjusted for
announced depreciation was approximately three percent per month and non—gold
reserves had declined to approximately forty percent of their first quarter
peak. The stabilization program began to fall apart when, In early February
1981 and in April 1981, the peso was devalued by 10% and 31% respectively.
Soon thereafter, dual exchange rates were adopted with the capital account
rate allowed to float freely.
3.TheModel
In this section we develop a monetary model of a balance-of-payment
crisis. At the end of each period agents are assumed to adjust their holdings
of'realcash balances according to the money demand function,
(1)
where fl't is log of the nominal money stock, t is the log of the domestic
price level, I is the nominal interest rate, and t is an iid normal
disturbance with mean zero and constant variance, Uncovered Interest
parity is assumed to hold so that,
it I +
—st,
4No trading is assumed to occur between periods so that oncemoney holdings
are chosen, the choice is locked In until the following period.6
where,i is the foreign nominal interest rate and is the exchange rate
agents expect to prevail at the end of period t+1 given information available
at the end of period t. The foreign interest rate is given exogenously and is
assumed to evolve as a random walk,5
+et,
where et is a N(O,o) innovation.Next, we assume that purchasing power
parity holds so that t t•6 Combining the money demand equation (1) with
the uncovered interest parity and purchasing power parity assumptions, we
obtain the standard money demand function popular in the monetary approach to
exchange rates,
(2)
Finally, we abstract from the banking system so that all money is high-
powered money,
mt lri(Rt +Dt),
where Dt and Rt are the domestic and foreign assets of the central bank
respectively.The home currency value of the central bank'sforeignassets
5The random walk assumption for the foreign interest rate can be tested by
regressing i on Dickey and Fuller (1979) derive the limiting
distribution of the t-ratio testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient
is one. Although the distribution of the t—ratio is not normal, percentiles
of the distribution for various sample sizes are found in Fuller (1976).
Carrying out the Dickey-Fuller unit root test on the one—month eurodollar
interest rate over a period of January 1979 to December 1980 yields a
coefficient estimate of 1.019 and a t ratio of .597. The null hypothesis of a
unit root in the foreign interest rate is not rejected at reasonable
significance levels.
6Foreign prices are assumed constant and are normalized to 1.7
can change due to exchange rate changes as well as foreign exchange market
intervention. When the home currency depreciates, the central bank
experiences a capital gain on its foreign currency denominated assets.The
decision to monetize such capital gains as a means of government finance is
entirely discretionary.The alternative is the creation of an accounting
liability that offsets the increase in the home currency value of central bank
foreign assets without directly increasing the high-powered money stock.
Monetization is thus completely analogous to an increase in the domestic
assets of the central bank, even though it presupposes a rise in the local
currency value of the bank's foreign assets. Therefore it should be included
when calculating domestic credit changes and excluded when calculating reserve
changes. Throughout this paper we therefore use RtSoFt as our measure of
central bank foreign assets, where S0 is the exchange rate in some base period
and Ft is the foreign currency value of central bank foreign assets.
Domestic credit growth (including monetization of valuation changes) is
assumed to be governed by the need to finance the fiscal deficit, and is
therefore exogenously given.Domestic credit then evolves as Dt+i =
Dt(1÷J.It÷i),where is the rate of domestic credit growth between the end
of t and the end of t+1. The fiscal deficit and therefore the required rate
of domestic credit expansion is assumed not to be influenced by exchange rate
policy.7
7This assumption is motivated by political constraints on fiscalpolicy.
Obstfeld (1986a) shows that if the process governing domestic credit growth
changes with the exchange rate regime, there may be multiple equilibria and
rational, self-fulfilling balance of payments crises may arise.8
The future path of' domestic credit is unknown to agents at each point in
time and is subject to both permanent and transitory stochastic disturbances,
lit+1 +
where t + is the permanent disturbance, and ti is the
temporary disturbance.Both c and 5 are assumed to be independently and




The authorities are assumed to have adopted a crawling peg under which the
exchange rate will evolve as st+15t + t+i' where ti is the preannounced
rate of crawl. However, agents do not necessarily believe that the crawling
peg will be followed by the authorities in all circumstances. Instead, when
forming expectations about the next period's exchange rate, agents need to
asses the credibility of announced policy.
The ability and willingness of the authorities to adhere to the announced
rate of crawl depends crucially on whether that exchange rate policy is
consistent with the monetary and fiscal policies pursued by the authorities.
The formulation of fiscal policy Is frequently subject to strong political
constraints that are especially severe In the case of public sector
8An advantage that this distributional assumption has over the assumption
that the change in domestic credit is exponentially distributed as in Flood
and Garber (19814) is that It allows domestic credit to contract such as occurs
in 7 of the 214 months that we analyze.9
enterprises. In Argentina, these enterprises often run large deficits
financed by the central bank or by transfers from the central government. If
the financing needs of the public sector arising from deficits exceeds levels
consistent with the announced rate of crawl, the credibility of the announced
exchange rate policy will be undermined.9
If the crawling peg proves to be unsustainable due to the need to finance
public sector deficits, we assume the authorities will abandon the crawling
peg and allow the exchange rate to float.0 The probability as of the end of
period t that the crawling peg will be abandoned at the end of t+1 is denoted
as Therefore the probability that the crawling peg will be adhered to is
given by (1 —t•We therefore have,
t5t+i t t$+i + + (3)
where is the exchange rate expected of obtain if the authorities allow
the exchange rate to float at the end of period t+1.From (3) and the
uncovered interest parity assumption, we see that the difference between the
domestic interest rate and the foreign interest rate adjusted for the
announced rate of crawl will widen when the credibility of the crawling peg is
9Buiter (1986a) and Ize and Ortlz (1986) focus explicitly on the decisions
of the fiscal authorities in models of exchange rate crises. Here we do not
highlight these issues in interest of simplicity.
0Other assumptions are of course possible. Obstfeld (19814) examines the
dynamics of the exchange rate and reserves when a floating rate is adopted as
an interim measure and is followed by a resumption of fixed rates. Blanco and
Garber (1986) analyze the movement from one fixed rate to another and compute
the one-period-ahead collapse probabilities for the fixed Mexican peso
exchange rate from 1973 to 1982.10
reduced rises) and when the size of the depreciation expected given that
a collapse occurs increases.11 Combining (1) and (3) we obtain,
nit —Sta -b[i+ t÷i —bpt[tS+i
—(St+ Yt+i + t' (14)
which shows that desired real balances are given by real money demand that
would arise if the crawling peg were fully credible (a -b[i+ y÷]) less
the semi-elasticity of money demand multiplied by the expected capital loss on
domestic money holdings due to a collapse of the crawling peg regime.
The criterion that the authorities are assumed to employ in deciding
whether to adhere to the crawling peg has a simple form. The authorities will
continue pegging the exchange rate along the announced path so long as any
reserve loss resulting from that policy is not too large.If, however,
reserves fall to some critical level, R, the exchange rate will be allowed to
float. The assumption commonly adopted in the literature (Krugnian (1979) and
Flood and Garber (19814) for example) is that the central bank will abandon
pegging the exchange rate when reserves fall tozero.12This is not as
natural a choice as it may appear at first sight since the central bank may
decide to abandon their peg before reserves are exhausted completely or may
1Krasker (1980) analyzes the implications of expected devaluations for
tests of uncovered interest parity. Lizondo (1983) analyzes the behavior of
currency futures prices when a discrete devaluation of known size but unknown
timing is expected. Here, unlike in those models, the probability of collapse
is endogenous. Lewis (1986) and Stulz (1986) present models in which
uncertainty about monetary regimes can give rise to similar apparent ex-post
deviations from uncovered interest parity under floating exchange rates.
12Buiter (1986a) and Obstfeld (1986b) are exceptions.There, as in this
paper,netreserves are allowed to be negative.11
borrow from abroad so that net foreign reserves may become negative. Here we
assume that R may be nonzero and that agents do not know R with certainty, but
instead are assumed to have some prior probability distribution each period
over the possible values that H may take on. Clearly, H is no higher than the
current reserve level if no collapse has taken place. We therefore assume
that the upper limit is the current level of reserves.
The lower limit for the critical level of net foreign reserves is somewhat
more difficult to tie down. We want to allow for the possibility that central
bank net reserves may become negative, as was the case in Argentina in
February 1981.If one assumes that additional foreign credit will not be
available during a crisis and will only become available after a policy
reform, the lower limit on the possible critical value for net reserves will
be minus the central bank's current gross foreign liabilities.
Finally, the public's prior distribution for the central bank's critical
value for reserves is assumed to be uniform over the intervalto H, where
and are the lower and upper limits on the range of possible values for
the critical level of' reserves that were described above.
The assumption that the authorities adhere to the crawling peg until some
unknown reserve level, H, is reached is less restrictive than it may first
appear. The decision rule actually employed by the authorities may depend on
other factors and may be considerably more complex than the adoption of some
critical reserve level. In the monetary model employed here, what matters to
agents is the exchange rate (and therefore the money supply) that is expected12
if the crawling peg is abandoned.Since only the money supply matters to
agents and since domestic credit creation is exogenous, agents care only about
the stock of reserves that will remain once the peg is abandoned and not
directly about any other factors that may enter the authorities' decision
rule. We therefore focus on the reserve level prevailing upon collapse rather
than on other possible central bank decision rules. Uncertainty about this
reserve level is a convenient means of modeling uncertainty about the decision
rule.
It will prove convenient in solving for the collapse probability to focus
on the rate of growth of domestic credit.As was assumed above, the
probability as of the end of period t that a collapse will occur at the end of
period t÷1, is simply the probability that, if the authorities adhere to the
announced path for the exchange rate, reserves will fall below R.This
probability depends in turn on the probability that a sufficiently large
realization for domestic credit occurring.Define to be the smallest
realization of domestic credit growth that will cause reserves to fall toat
the end of period t+1.If is drawn and the authorities continue the
policy of a crawling peg, the central bank will observe that reserves have
reached their critical level and will then close the foreign exchange market
and announce that the exchange rate will be allowed to float in period t+2.
Since t÷ 1, money market equilibrium requires that
t÷i — a -bit+i-b[t+1t÷2
-s÷J+ (5)
where ln(R + Dt(1+t+i)) is the log of the money supply at the end of
period t÷1 given that a collapse of the crawling peg occurred at the end of13
period t+1 and given that is drawn, t+1t÷2 is similarly defined, and
St+lSt +
Next,we need to determine t÷1t+2 and then solve the model for
When exchange rates are flexible and and expectations are rational, themoney
demand function, (2), can be solved to obtain,
t÷13t+2
1b0(l+ t+1t+i+2
where -a+bit÷i— Sincethe foreign interest rate is







Given the stochastic structure of domestic credit creation described in
(2), Muth (1960) shows that the optimal forecast of future domestic credit
growth rates is given by,
—14 Vi t't+1 -''' "
whereA depends on the relative variances of the permanent and transitory
components of domestic credit growth.In addition, it can be shown that
tt+k for all k>1 is also given by (7).We thereforedenote tt+k as
will adopt the notationdo denote the value of some variable x given
that a collapse has occurred and given that the critical value for domestic
credit growth is realized.
14 obtaining this solution we have assumed thatlimT.. (b/1÷b)Ttst+T0.14
In order to solve (6) we must then deal with terms such as t+lmt÷1+2 =
Et÷iln(Rt+i+2+Dt+i+2).Since exchange rates are assumed to float freely
after a collapse of the crawling peg, reserves in the future will be constant
at R. Thus, we need to evaluate,
Et+iln[R +
Wewill do this by taking a taylor series approximation of t+i+2 around
Ut+i+20 for 1>0. A first—order approximation yields,
— Dt(1+jit+i) i
't+1+2 ='t÷i+ - _1't+j+1 H +Dt(1+1t+i)
Taking expectations conditional on t÷i being drawn and noting that if is
drawn, ti A t +(l—X)tt+i,we obtain,
t+lrnt÷i÷2mt+1 +Dt(1+t÷i)i( +(1-A)t+i).
H +
Next,we use this expression to obtain,15
1 +b1=0(i+b
F2
Dt(1+it i — —
nit÷l+b +(A + (l-A)ut+i) H +Dt(1+ut+i)
Combining this with (6) and the money market equilibrium condition, (5),
yields,
151n obtaining this expression we make use of the solution, "jhi=
h/(1—h)2.15
ln(R + Dt(1+it+i)) —(St+ Yt+i -a + bi!+i (8)
1 _____D(1+jii.) —
—t+i—u i..
(Ai + (1—x)pt+i). 1+b 1+b R+Dt(1+3it+i)
While we cannot solve (8) directly for 11tf1' is straightforward tosolve
for t÷i numerically.Given this solution for tiwe can solve for t' the
probability as of the end of tofa collapse occurringatthe end of period
t+1. The probability of collapse is simply Pr(Mt+lt÷O•SinceUt+1 is
the sumoftwo independent normal random variables, we know that -
N(it,cY2),where cr2c + a. If H were known, we could solve for the
collapse probability by integrating (numerically) over the density for
However since R is unknown and since t÷i is a function of H, we must first
evaluate the probability of collapse conditional on H and then integrate over
the possible values that R may take on. We therefore have,
=(% +RY (1 -"t+i-t1/a)) dR (9)
where is the standard normal distribution function.As can be seen from
(8),tialso depends on i÷1 and the money demand disturbance,t+1'
neither of which is known to agents at time t. We therefore proceed as with H
by evaluating the probability of collapse conditional on particular
realizations of these random variables and then integrating over the possible
values they may take on. This solution for the collapse probability can be
combined with (8) to obtain a full solution of the model.
1$,EmpiricalEstimates
In this section we obtain and discuss estimates of the time series of
collapse probabilities for the Argentine crawling peg experiment that lasted16
from December 1978 to January 1981.An advantage of the simplicity of the
model set out in section 3 is that in order to compute the collapse
probabilities we need only the parameters of the money demand function, a and
b, the parameter in the money forecasting rule, X, and the variance of the
change in domestic credit, ci2. Once these are obtained, the integral (9) can
be evaluated numerically.16
Estimation of the parameters of the money demand equation is carried out
using instrumental variables to account for the potential endogeneity of the
domestic interest rate. Using a constant term and the foreign interest rate




where the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.17
We now turn to estimation of X, the parameter in the forecasting rule for
domestic credit growth. In obtaining an estimate of X, it will prove useful
to define vt+1 as the one-period—ahead forecast error for domestic credit
growth realized at the end of period t+1.That is ut÷1 =tt+i+vt+1.
Next, we note that the forecasting rule for domestic credit growth (7) can be
6We also need estimates of ae and
a1.1.The first of these is the standard
deviation of the first difference in the foreign interest rate and can be
calculated directly. The second is obtained when estimating the money demand
equation.
17The data employed in the empirical part of the paper are described in the
data appendix.17
rewritten as, tt+i tit +(1—A)'•Combiningthese we obtain,
—= vt+l—Xv.
If the information set available to agents when they forecast domestic credit
growth includes past forecast error, Vt will be serially uncorrelated.In
this case the variance and first autocovariance of the first difference in the
growth rate of domestic credit can be written as (1_X)24 and
respectively. These can be combined to obtain a quadratic function that can
be solved for A.Using the sample estimates of the variance and first
autocovariance of the first difference in domestic credit yields a Value of A
.62.18
Now that we have obtained estimates of a, b, and A, we can use these
estimates to obtain estimates of the one-period—ahead probabilities of a
collapse in the Argentine crawling peg. In estimating these collapse
probabilities, we first solve (8) to obtain an estimate of the critical value
for domestic credit growth, each period and then integrate (9) to obtain
our estimates of t•19 The estimates we obtain are presented in Figure 1 and
are quite reasonable both in the estimated magnitude of the probabilities and
in their behavior over time. The estimates of the collapse probabilities are
18we choose the root of the quadratic that is less thanone is absolute
value in order to insure stability of (7).The sample period used for
estimating the variance and first autocovariance is January 1979 to June 1980.
This shorter sample is used since a complex value for A is obtained when the
full sample is used.
19The numerical integration is done using Simpson's rule.The normal
distributions for et+1 and are truncated and the integration is carried
out over —3 standard deviations to +3 standard deviations.18
also found in Table 1, along with domestic credit growth rates. The table
suggests that rapid domestic credit growth in the spring of 1980 brought about
a rapid loss of confidence in the crawling peg.The results also indicate
that confidence was never fully restored and that just prior to the collapse
of the crawling peg the credibility of the announced exchange rates was
extremely low.
The estimated probabilities are very small through the first quarter of
1980 and in most cases are below 1 percent.The largest value during this
period occurs in September 1979 when the estimated probability is only 2.8%.
Following the financial crisis in March 1980, central bank reserves begin to
decline after more than 2 years of steady growth, domestic credit growth
during April 1980 exceeds 116% (this figure is not annualized), and the
collapse probability rises to 8.1% at the end of the month.2° When domestic
credit growth during May again exceeds 140%, forecasts of future domestic
credit growth rise substantially, central bank reserves decline again, and the
collapse probability rises to approximately 36%.In the following month
domestic credit grows by only 8% and, as a result, the collapse probability
falls to 25% at the end of June 1980.A 112% expansion in domestic credit
growth during July again undermines the credibility of the announced crawling
peg and the collapse probability rises to nearly 67% at the end of July. A
sharp contraction of domestic credit during August temporarily restores
20The money multiplier (either for Ml or M2) shows no sign ofdecreasing
around the time of the crisis so that the increase in domestic credit is not
simply an attempt to counteract a money multiplier decrease that might be
expected to accompany a crisis in the banking system.19
Table 1: Estimated Collapse Probabilities and Domestic Credit Growth Rates
(percent)
Date t Ut
1979 1 0.04 —11.27
1979 2 0.01 —1.118
1979 3 0.07 20.89
1979 11 0.23 14.37
1979 5 0.01 —9.35
19796 1.22 34.51
1979 7 0.07 —10.25
1979 8 0.12 7.32
1979 9 2.81 29.81
1979 10 0.12 —15.35
1979 11 0.43 12.71
1979 12 0.38 4.00
1980 1 0.05 -8.68
1980 2 0.05 1.10
1980 3 0.09 3.91
1980 11 8.11 46.05
1980 5 36.00 40.09
1980 6 25.23 8.01
1980 7 67.45 42.111
1980 8 6.99 —29.72
1980 9 31.68 29.83
1980 10 40.33 15.58
1980 11 36.83 6.66
1980 12 77.30 38.84
is the estimated probability at the end of period t that the
crawling peg will be abandoned at the end of period t+1. jiis
the rate of domestic credit growth from the end of period t—1 to the













































































































































































confidence in the announced exchange rate policy, bringing about a gain in
central bank reserves. When domestic credit expands by nearly 30% in
September, confidence is reduced once again. The credibility of the crawling
peg remains low for the rest of the year, reserve losses grow, and the
collapse probability rises to 77% at the end of December 1980, following a
domestic credit expansion of nearly L0% during that month.
5. Conclusion
The credibility of a policy of preannounced exchange rates is undermined
if the fiscal and domestic credit policies of the authorities do not prove to
be consistent with the exchange rate policy. In this paper we present a model
in which agents observe the domestic credit policies of the authorities and
forecast future domestic credit policies on the basis observed behavior. The
model can be solved each period for the probability that in the next period
the authorities will abandon the exchange rate policy. Once we obtain this
solution, the model is applied to the Argentine crawling peg from the
beginning of 1979 to the end of 1980. The empirical results are interesting
and indicate the the simple model employed produces quite plausible results.
We find that in the second quarter of 1980 domestic credit growth increases
and undermines confidence in the crawling peg. Eventually, the credibility of
the announced exchange rates is nearly completely undermined and, immediately
prior to the abandonment of the crawling peg by the authorities, the one-
month-ahead collapse probability rises to 77 percent.21
DataAppendix
Dt:Domestic assets of the central bank at the end of the month in
millions of pesos. Calculated as Mt -SOFt,where
period 0 is December 1978.
Ft: Foreign assets of the central bank at the end of the month in millions
of pesos. Source: International Financial Statistics.
it: Nominal interest rate on one-month peso deposits at the end of the
month. Source: International Financial Statistics.
1!: Nominal interest rate on one-month eurodollar deposits at the end
of the month. Source: World Financial Markets.
Mt: High powered money at the end of the month in millions of pesos.
Source: International Financial Statistics.
Rt: Foreign assets of the central bank at the end of the month In
millions of pesos. Calculated as SoFt.
St: Exchange rate at the end of the month in pesos per dollar. Source:
International Financial Statistics.
Gross foreign liabilities of the central bank at the end of the month
In millions of pesos. Source: International Financial Statistics.22
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